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1. Introduction 
According to data published by OECD (2009, Tables A8.2 and A8.4), various countries 
effectively subsidize education while other countries effectively tax education. Such a finding 
does not only raise the question of which policy is superior, it also raises the question of 
whether and how the effective subsidization of education can be justified in terms of 
efficiency. This paper studies this question in a framework of overlapping generations and 
endogenous growth. Two reasons of why education should be subsidized are highlighted. One 
of these is already known from the literature. It is the potential need to internalize the positive 
effect that human capital investments of selfish individuals have on the productivity of 
descendent generations. Efficient internalization requires subsidizing investments up to the 
first best. This paper stresses the second reason. This is the negative effect that distortionary 
taxation of labour has on education and growth. If the elasticity of the human capital 
investment function is strictly increasing, it is shown to be a second best policy to subsidize 
education even relative to the first best. 
The traditional approach to optimal taxation follows Ramsey (1927) and takes the model of a 
representative taxpayer as a starting point. A critical feature of this literature is that the results 
characterizing optimal policy heavily depend on whether the representative taxpayer plans for 
finite or infinite periods. If the taxpayer’s planning horizon is infinite, the rationale for 
employing distortionary linear taxes and subsidies turns out to be weak. This point was 
originally made by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) with respect to capital taxes. It extends, 
however, to the model with endogenous education, as has been demonstrated by Bull (1993), 
Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993, 1997), and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999). The 
question of whether human or nonhuman capital is accumulated is largely irrelevant. In the 
long run neither accumulation should be distorted. 
The policy recommendations are less clear-cut if the taxpayer’s planning horizon is finite. In 
the finite case it is primarily a matter of marginal rates of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption whether taxing saving is efficient or not. In particular, saving should be untaxed 
only if the taxpayer’s utility is weakly separable between consumption and labour and 
homothetic in consumption (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972; Sandmo, 1974). By contrast, the 
design of efficient education policy is more a reflection of the specific properties of the 
earnings function. This function has to be weakly separable in qualified labour supply and 
education and the elasticity with respect to the latter has to be constant if it shall be second 
best not to distort the choice of education (Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008; Bovenberg and   3
Jacobs, 2005). If weak separability holds and if the elasticity is strictly increasing, it is second 
best to subsidize education (Richter, 2009). If the planner trades off efficiency and equity and 
if education and qualified labour are complementary, it is equally second best to subsidize 
education (Jacobs et al., 2008). 
It somewhat discredits the Ramsey approach that the suggested policy recommendations so 
critically depend on the taxpayer’s planning horizon. That is why the present paper studies 
optimal taxation in a model with overlapping generations. Such a model stands between the 
static and dynamic Ramsey frameworks and it therefore promises less debatable policy 
recommendations. The broader objective of the present study is to characterize optimal 
policies for education, labour, and saving in a dynamic framework with overlapping 
generations. The narrower objective is to rationalize the effective subsidization of endogenous 
education. Such objectives may justify putting aside various shortcomings often turned 
against similar studies. In particular, we exclusively focus on efficiency and we stick to the 
representative taxpayer framework because one would not really be surprised to learn that 
subsidizing education can well be optimal when equity is traded off against efficiency. 
Furthermore, we rule out potential reasons of market failure because they may help to justify 
market intervention but certainly not the subsidization of education relative to the first best.  
The model chosen is one with overlapping generations and endogenous growth. Individuals 
live for two periods. They decide on education, saving, and nonqualified labour in their youth. 
They supply qualified labour when old. The productivity of qualified labour increases in the 
stock of human capital inherited from preceding generations, and it also increases in own 
educational investments. Individuals either may be perfect altruists with respect to descendent 
generations or may behave selfishly. The implications of selfishness have been studied before 
by Wigger (2002, Sec. 3.4) and Docquier et al. (2007) for a framework in which the 
government is not constrained in the use of policy instruments. It is shown that decentralizing 
the first best requires subsidizing education up to the first best. The present paper goes beyond 
these earlier studies by endogenizing labour supply and by assuming that the government can 
only employ linear policy instruments. Most remarkably, major results characterizing efficient 
static policy extend to the dynamic framework. In particular, it is second best not to distort 
education if the human capital investment function is isoelastic in education. It is argued, 
however, that such constant elasticity has debatable implications in a dynamic framework. It 
implies that the human capital stock accumulated by preceding generations melts down to 
zero if just one generation stops investing. More appealing is the assumption that the elasticity 
of the investment function is increasing and that the human capital stock does not depreciate   4
completely if just one generation fails to invest. If this is the case, it is second best at balanced 
growth to subsidize education even relative to the first best. This means that the marginal 
social cost of human capital should exceed the marginal social return in the long-run second-
best optimum. This is a striking result. Not surprising is the need to subsidize education 
relative to laissez faire. This is so because the intergenerational externalities of human capital 
investments have to be internalized.
1 A priori it is not obvious, however, why investments 
should even exceed the first-best. Subsidizing education requires government revenue, which 
in the model has to be raised by distortionary taxes on labour and savings. With the intuition 
of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956/57) in mind, one might hypothesize that it is second best to 
provide insufficient incentives for education if labour has to be taxed and if the level of 
comparison is the first best. The contrary, however, is true. The key assumption is the strictly 
increasing elasticity of the human capital investment function with respect to education. The 
effect is that it is second best to subsidize education in static analysis, and this effect is shown 
to extend to the dynamic framework. At balanced growth the need to subsidize increases in 
the derivative of the investment function’s elasticity and in two further factors. One factor is 
the Lagrange multiplier on the planner’s implementability constraint, and the other is the gap 
between the marginal return to capital and the rate of balanced growth. In other words, the 
more binding the non-availability of lump-sum taxes is and the more deficient the growth is, 
the more should human capital accumulation overshoot the first best. 
Assuming altruistic individuals changes some conclusions, but not all. Altruists internalize the 
positive effect that education has on descendents’ productivity. Hence the need for 
government intervention is reduced. However, the second source of inefficiency modelled in 
this paper does not vanish. That second source is the need to employ distortionary taxes for 
financing government expenditures. The implications for second-best policy are shown to 
differ markedly between the first generation and all descendent generations. With respect to 
descendent generations the following results are obtained. The accumulation of human capital 
should not be distorted, and this result is obtained for arbitrary utility and human capital 
investment functions. Furthermore, qualified and nonqualified labour should be taxed 
uniformly across the life cycle when utility is homogeneous in consumption and 
multiplicative in the sub-utilities of consumption and non-leisure. Such results strongly 
contrast with those derived for the case of selfish individuals. 
The results obtained for the first generation are less contrasting. In particular, it is second best 
not to distort the first generation’s educational choice if the human capital investment function 
                                                 
1 The need is highlighted by various earlier studies. An example is Del Rey and Racionero (2002).   5
is isoelastic in education. If, however, this function fails to be isoelastic, the optimal education 
policy for the first generation depends on initial values. On neutralizing the effect of 
initialization by assuming balanced growth and assuming a strictly increasing elasticity of the 
human capital investment function, it turns out to be second best to subsidize education. The 
reason is the same encountered when individuals are selfish. Strictly increasing elasticity is 
the reason why it is second best to subsidize education in static analysis. This effect extends to 
the dynamic framework. The need to subsidize is the stronger the larger the derivative of the 
investment function’s elasticity is, the more binding the non-availability of lump-sum taxes is, 
and the more deficient growth is. 
The unifying bottom line for selfish and altruistic individuals is as follows. Altruism well 
reduces the need to subsidize education relative to laissez faire, and altruism also implies that 
descendent generations should have non-distorted incentives to invest in human capital. The 
short-run policy recommendations for altruism, however, agree with the long-run 
recommendations for selfishness. Labour has to be taxed, and – given that the elasticity of the 
human capital investment function is strictly increasing – education should be subsidized 
relative to the first best.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the two-period overlapping-generations 
model with endogenous growth. The first-order conditions characterizing solutions of the 
planner’s first-best maximization are derived. In Section 3 the utility functions are determined 
that are compatible with balanced growth in consumption and with constant use of labour and 
leisure. Section 4 studies the planner’s problem when individuals behave selfishly and when 
no policy instruments but linear ones are available. Section 6 clarifies the relation between 
effective and efficient subsidization. Section 6 studies the planner’s problem for individuals 
who are altruistic towards descendent generations. Section 7 summarizes. 
 
 
2. The model and the planner’s first-best problem 
Consider a sequence of overlapping generations with individuals living for two periods. The 
index t refers to the generation and to the period in which the representative individual of 
generation  t is young and in her life period 0. Lifetime utility is given by 
 with the arguments   and   denoting consumption and 
non-leisure in the life periods i=0,1. Utility is strictly increasing in consumption, is strictly 
t U ≡ 0101 (,,, tttt UC C L L) , 010 ,, ttt CCL 1t L  6
decreasing in non-leisure, and is strictly concave. Additional restrictions on preferences 
required if the economy is to exhibit steady state growth are discussed in Section 3. Non-
leisure in the second life period,  , equals qualified labour supplied to the market in period 
t+1. By contrast, non-leisure in the first life period has to be divided between nonqualified 
labour supply   and education  . The effect of education is to increase human capital 
and labour productivity.   is the stock of human capital determining the productivity in 
period t. It is built up by generation t−1 and inherited by generation t. By spending time   on 
education, generation t determines the stock of human capital   effective in the second life 
period. The human capital accumulation equation is 
1t L
0t LE −
1 t H − t H
t t E
1 t H −
t E
t H
() t GE = .         (
t
t μ β )   (1) 
t
t μ β  is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the planner’s problem we are about to set up. 
The investment function   is assumed to be non-negative and strictly monotone 




' / E EG G η ≡  smaller than one. The case of constant elasticity η  
plays a prominent role in static models of endogenous education (Jacobs et al., 2008; Richter, 
2009) and equally in what follows. A critical implication is G(0)=0 so that the stock of human 
capital built up by generation t−1 melts down to zero,  =0, if generation t does not spend 
positive time on education. If one assumes instead 
t H
( ) t GE ≡ ()1 tH GE  δ + −  with  H δ <1 and 
some function   of constant elasticity  () GE  η , then  1 H t H (1 t H ) δ − = −  follows from  =0 so 
that some human capital is passed on to the next generation even if there are no new 
investments. In this case, the elasticity of the investment function, 
t E
1







η  =− , is 
strictly increasing in E. To allow for both scenarios with constant and increasing elasticity of 
G(E) we assume  '( ) E 0 η ≥  in what follows. 
The functional specification (1) is standard in the endogenous growth literature. It can be 
traced back to Uzawa (1965), and it has been used since by Lucas (1988), Atkeson et al. 
(1999), and others. A key feature is that   is linear homogenous in  . A notable 
implication of (1) is that time spent on education (learning) is the only variable input in the 
production of human capital. In particular, learning cannot be substituted by physical inputs or 
services supplied by instructors. There is however some cost of instruction which accrues in 
fixed proportion with education. For simplicity’s sake, it is modelled as a linear function of 
t H 1 t H −  7
inherited human capital and time spent on education,  1 tt f EH− . It is suggestive to interpret the 
exogenous parameter  f  as tuition fee.  
There is a second stock variable,  , to be interpreted as (nonhuman) capital built up by 
generation t in their first life period. It is not productive before the second life period, and it 
depreciates at the rate 
t K
K δ . Production F is linear homogenous in capital and effective labour. 
The resource constraint is  
  1 K (1 ) t FK t δ − +−  =      (
t
01 1 1 tt t t t CC f E H K −− ++ + t A + t α β )   (2) 
with  t F ≡ 10 1 1 11 (, ( ), tt t t t t FK L EH L H −− − ) − .  −
The variable  t A  denotes exogenous government spending. Such spending may be of 
consumptive and/or productive use. As  t A  is exogenous, we refrain from making it an explicit 
argument of the utility and/or production functions. When taking partial derivatives use is 
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Qualified and nonqualified labour may be perfect substitutes in production, but they need not 
be. Human capital is obviously labour augmenting. Note that education incurs two kinds of 
cost. There is the cost of forgone earnings, 
0 Lt F tt EH− , and the cost of tuition,  1 tt f EH− . 
 
The planner maximizes 












in   and   ( t=0,1,...) subject to the human capital accumulation 
equation (1) and the resource constraint (2). The parameters 
0101 ,,,, tttt t CCLLE t K
11 1 11 , ,, t KHL L − −− = − =  are 
exogenously given. 0<β <1 is a discount factor. Assume that this maximization – like all 
others still to follow – is well behaved and that it has an interior solution for which all choice 
variables are strictly positive. We abstain from stating all the assumptions needed to guarantee 
a well-behaved maximization with interior solutions. Identifying those assumptions must 
remain the object of independent research efforts. In the present paper we just state those 
assumptions explicitly needed to derive meaningful first-order conditions of second-best   8
policies. We study neither second-order conditions nor questions of existence. As argued in 
Richter (2009) and as will become clearer below, a well-behaved maximization requires a 
specification of   which is sufficiently concave to compensate for the 
lack of concavity of the human capital accumulation equation (1). The first-order conditions 
of the planner’s maximization are as follows: 




0 Ct U α = ,    =
1 Ct U 1 t α β + 0 L t F t H
0 Ct U =
0 Lt U − ,    =
1 1 Lt t FH + 1 Ct U
1 Lt U − ,     (4)  ,    1 −
  1 1 Kt F β





tt G μ =
0 () Lt f F + ,           ( 6 )   t α
1 t α β + [ + ( )
1 11 Lt t FL + 0 1 Lt F + ⋅ 01 tt LE ++ − 1− 1 t f E + ] = t μ β − 1 t G + 1 t μ + .    (7) 
The conditions (4) characterize efficient consumption and labour choices. The condition (5) 
characterizes efficient saving and efficient capital. The condition (6) characterizes the 
efficient choice of  , and (7) is the condition characterizing the efficient choice of  . 




μ  and inserting into (7) yields, after some straightforward manipulations, the 
condition characterizing the efficient accumulation of human capital, 
 
1 11 L tt FL + +
0 1 L t F + 01 t L + −
0 1 ( L t F + + ) 1 t E +   f



















.    (8)  ]
For the sake of brevity we also speak of efficient education if (8) holds. The first term on the 
left-hand side, 
1 11 L tt F L + , is the return to human capital accruing to generation t in the second 
life period, and the difference 
0 1 L t F + 01 t L + −(
0 1 L t F + + f ) 1 t E +  is the return accruing to individuals 
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 is the marginal cost of human 
capital one period later. Hence the right-hand side of (8) captures the cost resulting from 
investing in period t instead of postponing the investment to the next period. By separating 
terms referring to generation t from terms referring to generation t+1, (8) can be written as   9









1 11 L tt FL +  
= 
0 1 L t F + 01 t L + +(




−1] ≡  ,1 tt MEB + .      ( 1 0 )  
Because  1 1 t η + <  by assumption,  ,1 tt MEB +  is positive. It is the marginal external benefit 
enjoyed by generation t+1 and generated by the human capital investment of generation t. 
This excess benefit has to be internalized by first-best policy when individuals are selfish. As 








, exceeds generation t’s 
return to human capital, 
1 11 L tt FL + . 
 
 
3. Balanced growth 




, and  =E are 
constant across time while consumption, output, and both types of capital all grow at the 
common gross rate G=G(E), so that we have HG
t E
11 , H − −− − == it , . 
At balanced growth, 
0 i C
tt
i CG G C =≡
1 Kt F + = K F  is constant in t. If an efficient allocation is to be compatible 
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to be both constant in t. Taking total derivatives with respect to t and setting the total 
derivatives equal to zero implies constancy of  
   
00 10 0 00 10 [ ( ,..) ( ,..)]/ ( ,..)
tt t t t
CC CC C GC U GC GC U GC U GC ⋅+ ⋅
= [  
01 11 1 00 1 0 ( ,..) ( ,..)]/ ( ,..)
tt t t t
CC CC C GC U GC GC U GC U GC ⋅+ ⋅ 0 ≡  1 d −    (11) 
in t. Upon substituting   for   and integrating in   one obtains  i C  t
i GC i C 
01 01 CC CU CU + =          ( 1 2 )   dU cX +
where d, c are constants and where X is a function of  . The following two types of utility 
specifications satisfy this condition: 
01 , LL  10
(i)   =  0101 (,,,) UC C L L 01 01 (,)(,) VC C L L Λ ⋅ 01 (,) DL L −      ( 1 3 )  
where   is homogeneous of degree  01 (,) VC C 0 d ≠ ; 
(ii)   =  0101 (,,,) UC C L L 0 0 1 1 01 01 [l n l n] (,) (,) aCaC L LD L L Λ + − .    (14) 
Utility functions of type (13) satisfy condition (12) when setting  0 cd ≡ ≠ ,  X D ≡  and utility 
functions of type (14) satisfy condition (12) when setting  01 a ca ≡ + d ≡ ,  ,  0 X Λ ≡ . In the 
latter case homogeneity in consumption does clearly not hold in the strict sense, but (11) still 
holds with d=0. For the sake of brevity we choose to speak of homogeneity in both cases (13) 
and (14). In what follows homogeneity in consumption is assumed whenever second best 
policies are evaluated at balanced growth. 
An earlier characterization of utility functions compatible with growth in consumption and 
constancy in leisure is due to King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988, 2002). These authors however 
restrict their study to dynamic equilibria and government policies in a Ramsey-type 
framework with exogenous growth. Furthermore, they work with utility functions   
which have only two arguments. (13) and (14) extend their findings. 
( , ) UCL
Assuming balanced growth and utility to be homogeneous of degree d in consumption, we 
obtain  = . Hence 
0 Ct U
(1 ) dt G
−
00 C U 1 K K F δ + −  = 
1 d G
− /β  by (5). Furthermore, the condition of 
transversality,     0 for t , implies ()
0 Ct t UK





C GU G K
−
1 β −    0 for t , i.e., 
. As a result, the return to capital exceeds the growth rate:  
→ →∞
1
d G β <
 1 K K F δ +−  =  /
1 d G
− β  > G.          ( 1 5 )  
The following analysis studies second-best policy with regard to education, to saving, and 
also to labour. The focal question, however, is whether it is second best to provide or not to 
provide efficient incentives for education. As we shall see, much depends on the elasticity of 
the elasticity of the investment function G(E) and on whether individuals are perfect altruists 
towards their children or not. In the altruistic model – also called the dynasty model – 
individuals are assumed to maximize (3). In the other case the representative individual is 
assumed to maximize own lifetime utility 
            ( 1 6 )   0101 (,,, tttt UC C L L)
subject to the own lifetime budget constraint. We study both scenarios, and we start by 
analyzing efficient taxation in the standard OLG framework with selfish individuals. The 
approach taken is called the primal approach in optimal taxation.    11
 
 
4. Optimal taxation in the standard OLG model with selfish individuals 
The selfish individual representing generation t is assumed to maximize (16) in the five 
ariables ,  and savings   subject to the life-period budget constraints 
 
  0101 ,,,, tttt t CCLLE t S
00 1
v
() tt tt LE H ω − −   =   S 01 tt t t t CE H ϕ − ++     ( )           (17a)  0t λ
  11 1 () tt t t LGE H + 1 t R ω − t S   =   1t C .      ( 1t λ )           (17b + ) 
 this optimization  mption, any excess 
supply of savings,  , is invested in government bonds. 
In 1 is treated as an exogenous parameter. By assu t H −
SK − tt 0t ω  is the wage rate of 
nonqualified labour,  1t ω  is ition fee, and   the tu 1 t R +  is the wage rate of qualified labour,  t ϕ  is 
the return earned on savings. All these prices and costs are after tax and subsidy. For each t 
there are six first-order conditions 
0 Ct U = 0t λ ,   
1 Ct U 1t λ = ,           ( )  
0t
1 8
ω 1 t H − 0 Ct U =
0 Lt U − ,    1t ω 1 () tt E H G − 1 Ct U =
1 L t U − ,       ( 1 9 )  
11 tt L ω
'
t G
1 C 0 ) t t U =( t ϕ ω
0 Ct U ,    1 t R + = 01 / tt λ λ .       ( 2 0 )   +
They are constraints in the planner’s optimal ta
primal approach to optimal taxation these conditions are used to substitute for the four relative 
prices  1
xation problem we are about to set up. In the 
01 ,, , tt t Rt ω ωϕ , + o  ra ultipliers  01 , tt  and the tw Lag nge m λ λ . After substituting, the 
lifetime budget constraint derived from (17a,b) can be written as 
 
1
i Lt  =  t
0
[]





1 1tL t LU .      (
t
t λβ  )    (21) 
The condition (21) assumes the role of an implementability constraint in the planner’s second-
best problem. Because  
− t η
1 1tL L U t
0 Ct U (19),(20) = 0 tt () ϕ ω + 1 tt EH− ,         ( 2 2 )  
1) can be interpreted as the private cost of education. As it turns out, 
the marginal increase in   is of partic
the right-hand side of (2
t H ular significance when characterizing second-best   12
policies. Let us call the marginal increase the private marginal cost of human capital. The 
formal definition is 
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 = − .     ( 2 3 )  
The private m al cost is obviou increasing in the el
the elasticity 
argin sly  asticity of the elasticity of  ( ) t GE . If 
t η =η ( t E ) is constant, 
HC
t PMC =0 results. If the elasticity is how tly  ever stric
increasing, 
HC
t PMC  is positive.  
 
The planner maximizes the sum of discounted lifetime utilities (3) in  ,
nd   ( t=0,1,...) subject to the implementability constraint (21
0101 ,,,, , tttt tt CCLLE H  
), the human capital 
ledged description of
a t K
accumulation equation (1), and the resource constraint (2). In a fully-f  
the planner’s maximization one would have to include the first-order conditions of profit 
maximization. However, these conditions can be used to substitute for the endogenous factor 
prices before taxes and subsidies. Hence, they are not constraining the planner. The solutions 
are second best in the sense that they have to fulfil the implementability constraint in addition 
to the first-best constraints (1) and (2). If lump-sum taxes were available, the planner could 
ignore (21). Inclusion of (21) in the set of constraints implies that the planner is restricted in 
the choice of policy instruments. The restriction is however not an arbitrary one. Quite to the 
contrary, implicit in the derivation of (21) is the assumption that the planner is not constrained 
in setting consumer prices  01 ,, , tt t ω ωϕ and  1 t R + . This means in particular that labour income 
can be taxed at different rates over an individual’s life cycle. If such differentiation is ruled 
out by assumption, the plan espec  additional constraint, which may have strong 
implications for the design of optimal taxation. See Erosa and Gervais (2002) for a discussion 
of this point in an OLG model without endogenous education. 
To solve the planner’s problem set 
ner has to r t an
 
1
t t t W ≡ U +λ  {
0
[]
i it C t it
i=
i Lt CU LU + ∑ − t η
1 1tL t L U }   .       ( 2 4 )  
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:  1 t α + β [
1 11 L tt F L + +
0 1 L t F + ⋅( 01 1 tt LE ++ − ) −  1 t f E + ] +  1 t μ + β 1 t G +  =  t μ .    (29) 
 
We wish to derive characterizations of second-best policy with regard 
and labour. We start with saving. As has been shown by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), 
andmo (1974), Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), and others, it is efficient not to distort 
saving if utility is weakly separable between consumption and non-leisure and is homothetic 
to saving, education, 
S
in consumption,  01 01 (( , ) , , ) UU V C CL L =  with a linear homogeneous function V. The utility 
functions defined in (13) and (14) are examples of weakly separable and homothetic 
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  δ + +−  =  =    .        (
 optimal from the planner’s perspective to equate 
the marginal rate of return to capital with the private marginal rate of substitution in 
ption. 
3 1 )  
This has to be interpreted as saying that it is
consum  14
 
Proposition 1: If behaviour is selfish and if utility is weakly separable between consumption 
and non-leisure and homothetic in consumption, it is second best not to distort saving. 
accumu  
hich are the first-order conditions with respect to  , and  . By making use of (27) 
 
We turn next to education. We first prove that it is efficient not to distort human capital 
lation if the investment function G is isoelastic. We do so by relying on (27)–(29),
w t K ,  t E t H
and (28), (29) can be written as 
[
1 11 L tt FL + +
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t PMC ][ 1 1 KtK F δ + + −
G
] .      ( 3 2 )  
Obviously, (32) equals (8) whenever  =0 which is the case if  ( ) t E η 1
HC
t PMC + =
HC
t PMC  is 
constant. 
 
ond best not to distor
man capital investment function G(E) is isoelastic. 
static t  and Jacobs, 2005). An intuitive 
xplanation is the following. The planner cares about two objectives. One objective is to 
Proposition 2: Assume selfish behaviour. It is sec t education if the 
hu
 
Proposition 2 is a dynamic version of the education efficiency proposition, well known from 
ax analysis (Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008; Bovenberg
e
minimize the efficiency loss resulting from distorted choices of consumption and leisure. The 
other objective is to minimize losses in the rent income generated by education. In general, 
these two minimizations are not separable, so that the planner has to trade off. Separability is 
only ensured if the human capital investment function is isoelastic. If this is the case and if the 
set of policy instruments is sufficiently rich, it is efficient not to distort education and to 
minimize the efficiency loss resulting from distorted choices of consumption and leisure. 
According to Proposition 2 this result extends to the dynamic framework and it does not 
explicitly rely on the utility specifications (13) and (14). Things are different if the private 
marginal cost of human capital is positive. 
To study this case set   15
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+
−
1 11 L tt FL + −[
0 1 L t F + ⋅( 01 t LE 1 t )− 1 t f E + − + + ] .       ( 3 4 )  
omparison of (34) and (8) reveal that C s    t Δ  
a
e
is the e e between the social cost and 
the social benefit of investing in hum n capital in period t instead of postponing the 
investment by one period. A positive w dge stands fo
fficient wedg
r subsidizing relative to the first best. A 
priori the sign of  t Δ  is indeterminate. This is different if (33) is evaluated at a balanced 
growth path. By definition, balanced growth means that the non-leisure choices 
00 11 , tt LL LL == , and  t E =E are constant in t while consumption, output, and both types of 
capital all grow a the common gross rate G=G(E), so that we have  11
t
t HG H −− = , 
11
t
t KG K −− = , 0
tt
it i i CG CG C =≡ . At balanced growth  1
t 
Kt F + = K F ,  1 t G + =G in t. Because the 
 are as  ecified in (13) and (14), the other variables entering (33) take on the 
following values: 
t





(1 ) dt G
−
00 C U ≡
(1 ) d G
−
HC

















































 =  0
HC PMC  ≡ 
HC PMC .   = 
Because  U  is homogeneous of degree d in consumption, W is likewise homogeneous of 
degree d in consumption. As a result, the growth factor   cancels out in equation (25): 
t G
0 Ct W =−
0
0 1 Lt t −
the Lagrange multiplier  t
Lt W
FH
. After cancelling out, the only  t in this equation is  variable carrying an index 
λ  . Hence  


























(1 ) dt G
−
0 Ct W
00 C W ≡
(1 ) dt G
−
0 C W (iv)  t α  . 
R Eventually, setting  ≡ 1 K K F δ +− , (33) can be written as 
  Δ = 
0 C U
λ  ⋅
HC ⋅ PMC G) .      (
0 C W
R     ( 3 5 )  
Interpret   as the social cost associated with the implementability constraint. This 
−
00 / CC UW λ
ositive if 

factor is p the implementability constraint is binding, λ >0, which is the case if the 
the cost resulting from the non-availability of lump-sum taxes. 
non-availability of lump-sum taxes is a binding constraint.
2 se the factor measures   In this sen
HC PMC  is the private 
marginal cost of human capital, which is positive by assumption and increasing in  ' η . Finally, 
R G is the th gap, which by (15) must be positive as w −  grow ell. Hence Δ is the product of 
three positive factors. 
roposition 3: Assume selfish behaviour, and U to satisfy (13) or (14). At balanced growth it 
is second best to subsidize education relative to the first best if the private marginal 
 
P
cost of human capital, 
HC PMC , is positive. The strength of positive distortion 
increases in (i) the private m ost of human capital, (ii) the growth gap, and (iii)  arginal c
the cost resulting from the non-availability of lump-sum taxes. 
 
his is a remarkable result, for reasons explained before. It is rather evident, and has been 
noted before, that the laissez-faire  level of education is inefficient from the first-best 
                                                
T
perspective. Without government intervention, selfish individuals externalize the positive 
effect of own education on descendent generations’ welfare. Not so evident is the result that 
human capital accumulation should be distorted along balanced growth while capital 
accumulation should not be distorted, subject to appropriately chosen utility functions. The 
 
2 We abstain from proving in detail that the Lagrange multiplier is positive. Jones et al. (1997, p. 109) do this for 
a maximization which comes close to the present one. The intuition is the following. Paying generation t some 
positive lump-sum income would show up on the right-hand side of (21). The Lagrange multiplier must be 
positive if increasing such a lump-sum income can be shown to have a negative effect on the planner’s objective 
function. The effect is indeed negative, because such a lump-sum transfer must be paid at the expense of 
government funds, which are generated by distortive taxes. Although the government budget constraint is not 
modelled explicitly, it has to be respected. This follows from Walras’s law. In summary, the non-availability of 
lump-sum taxes is the reason why λ   is positive.   17
sign of the efficient distortion is even less obvious. Note that any revenue needed to subsidize 
the cost of tuition has to be raised by distortionary labour taxes. With the intuition of Lipsey 
and Lancaster (1956/57) in mind, one could have hypothesized that it is second best to give 
negative incentives for human capital accumulation relative to the first best if labour has to be 
taxed. The contrary, however, is true. The key assumption is the strictly increasing elasticity 
of the human capital investment function with respect to education. If the elasticity is strictly 
increasing, the private marginal cost of human capital is positive. With a positive private 
marginal cost of human capital it is second best to subsidize education. This has been shown 
before by Richter (2009) to hold in static analysis, and it is shown here to extend to the 
dynamic framework. The need to subsidize increases in the factors listed in Proposition 3. In 
particular, it increases in the elasticity of the human capital investment function’s elasticity. 
We finally turn to the study of labour taxation. Of particular interest is the efficient taxation of 
           ( 3 6 )  
where V which is homogenous. In this particular case the first-order condition (25) implies: 
(1+
nonqualified labour relative to qualified labour. As the definition of  t W  in (24) is structurally 
asymmetric in  0t L  and  1t L , one may easily conjecture that qualified and nonqualified labour 
should be taxed differently. To make a clear case for differentiated taxation and to obtain 




(,) ( ) ii
i
UV C C D L
=
≡− ∑
0 L W +FH W  = 0.  ⇔  
0 1 L − 0 C
λ d)[ + ]  =  
0 L U
0 1 L FH − 0 C U λ  "'
00 0 0 0 [( ) ( 1 ) ( LD L dD L +− ) ]   .    (37) 
Similarly, (26) implies 
 = 0  
(1+
1 L W +FG H W
1 1 L − 1 C ⇔  
λ d)[ +  ]  =  
1 L U
1 1 L FG H − 1 C U λ  "'
11 1 1 1 [(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )] LD L d D L ηη −+ − −  .    (38) 
Denote by  L /
ii i ii L L LUU ν ≡
rates  i
>0 the elasticity of marginal utility of leisure in life-period i, and 
define tax  τ  by setting (1 ) / FH U U
00 01 LL 0 C τ − −= − ,  (1 ) / FG H U U
11 11 LL 1 C τ − − ≡−   ⇔  
(1 )F




















  .         ( 3 9 )      18
  0 η =
  i
For  and d= 39) is the familiar 
taxes
1, ( (inverse) elasticity rule. According to this rule, wage 
 should increase in  i ν . If utility were quasi-linear, the  i ν τ  would be the inverse of the 
wage elasticity of labour supply in life-period i. Hence taxes would have to vary inversely 
with the wage elasticities rendering the rule its name. The rule is extended by (39) to allow for 
endogenous education. The effect of education is to reduce the tax on qualified labour relative 
to the tax on nonqualified labour. The deviation from the elasticity rule increases in the 
elasticity of the human capital investment function, η. See Richter (2009), who derives (39) 
with d=1 for the static framework. It has to be noted that the given interpretation of (39) 
assumes a positive numerator. Such positivity is only ensured if the convexity of  1 D  (as 
measured by  1 ν ) and/or the concavity of V (as measured by 1 d − ) is sufficiently strong to 
compensate for the lack of concavity of the human capital accumulation equation (1). This 
lack of concavity is measured by η, and positivity of the numerator requires η  to be less than 
11 (1) / (1 ) d ν ν +− + . 
 
Proposition 4: Assume selfish behaviour, and U to satisfy (36). On a balanced growth path it 
is then second best to tax labour according to the elasticity rule (39). The effect of 
 
 
. Efficient and effective subsidization of education 
s mentioned in the introduction, OECD data suggest that various countries effectively 
cation. Before substantiating such a 
iduals obtaining tertiary education as part of initial education in 2005. 




subsidize education while others effectively tax edu
statement one has to clarify the underlying notion of effective subsidization and its relation to 
efficient subsidization. 
In the recent publication of 2009 the OECD reports estimates of the private and public net 
present values for indiv
In present notation the private net present value is 
priv NPV  ≡ 
10 11 1 / CC LGH U U ω − − 01 () EH ϕ ω − +    19









01 () EH ϕ ω −       .  +
For the sake  , the time index t dropped. The pub  net present value is the 
difference between the social and the private net present values where the social value 
of brevity  is  lic
  soc NPV  ≡ 
1 11 / L FL G H − [1 K K F δ +− ] − 
0 1 () L f FE H − +  
























Ff F δ +− +
   
E
− 1 
e private r te of return and th cial rate of return, respectively. Our suggestion is to speak 
of effective subsidization only to the extent that the private rate exceeds the social rate. Hence 
th a e so
denote by 




            ( 4 0 )  
e effe v  rate of subs th cti e idization. The efficient value  eff s  of this rate is determined by 
 ( 1 η − )s    =   1− eff def
1 1 L FL G
0 [1] ( ) KK L Ff F E
η
δ +− +
  =  
01 1 1] ( ) ' KKL L Ff F G F L
0
 [














δ +− + ' G
       ( 4 1 )  
where  '
0 () / L f FG +
) (1 ) / E
 is the social marginal cost of human capital and MEB  =  FL + 
0 0 L
(
0 L Ff + η η −  the marginal external benefit as specified by (9) and (10). With Δ and 
MEB f 41) confirms the view that there are two reasons for 
effective subsidization of education. One is the need to internalize the intergenerational 
the sake of illustration we report the empirical values of s for men as they can be computed by 
means of the data published by OECD (2009, tables A8.2 and A8.4). Positive values for s are 
obtained in case of TUR (.47), POL (.34), ESP (.22), POR (.20), AUT (.19), CAN (.18), NOR 
(.10), ITA (.09), and HUN (.04). Negative values are obtained for SWE (-.03), KOR (-.05), 
DEN (-.05), FIN (-.06), CZE (-.14), USA (-.16), NZL (-.20), GER (-.20), IRL (-.20), FRA (-
, 
extern
ef s  is positive as well. Equation (
ality and the other is the need to compensate for distortionary labour taxation. Just for   20
.32), BEL (-.32), and AUS (-.40). Such extreme differences in effective rates and even more 
the opposing signs clearly raise questions. A deeper analysis however has to remain the object 
of future research. The numbers are only reported to illustrate the empirical relevance of the 
theoretical investigation undertaken in this paper. 
 
 
6. Optimal taxation in the OLG model with altruistic individuals 
The perfectly altruistic individual is assumed to maximize  t U ≡ 




which by recursive substitution amounts to maximi  
  ] +  (
zing the sum
objec
 of discounted lifetim
tive is maximized utilities (3) in  0101 ,,,, ,, tttt tt CCLLE H  and  t K  (t=0,1, ...). This   s t 
to the human capital accumulation constraint (1) and the dynasty’s budget constraint, 
  11 1 0 0 1
0
[( ) ] tt t t t t t t t
t




+− ∑  
=     01 1 1 1 1
0
[( tt t t t t t t t t t t
t




++ + − ∑ ) λ ).      (42) 
t variables have the same meaning as before. Th itio
(t=0,1, ...) 
The price and cos e first-order cond ns are 
0 Ct t
tU β λπ = ,  
t β H
1 1 Ct t U λπ = ,   + 0t ω 1 t− 0 Ct U =
0 L t U − ,   H 1tt ω
1 Ct U = U − ,   (43) 
1 Lt
'
tt G μ = 0 () tt ϕ ,    1 t R + = 1 / t ,        ( 4 4 )   ω +
0 Ct U t π π +
t 1 t
1 t λπ + [ 11 tt L ω + 01 t ω + ( 01 t+ 1 t+ L − E )− 1 t ϕ +
+
1 t E + ] = β t μ β − 1 t G + 1 t μ + .   (45) 
The last condition implies  
  11 1 0
0
[ + tt t t
t
L λπω ω ++
= ∑ 1 0 1 1 1 1  ( ) ] t t t t L E E ϕ
∞













− ∑  
00 H μ  








=   .        ( 4 6 )  
Multiplying the budget constraint (42) through by λ  and using (43), (44), and (46) to 


















00 00 0 0 0 1 0 0 '
0





−− +  . 
Similarly, (43) and (44) can be used to substitute for  , t 10 11 ,, tt λπω ω + t μ  and  +  in (45), which 
leaves us with (t=0,1, ...) 
 
1 1tL t L U − − β [( 01 t L + − 1 t E + )U
0 1 Lt + + 1 t ϕ + 1 t E + t H
0 1 Ct U + ] 
    {
(45) = t μ β −   1 t G + 1 t μ + } t H  =  t μ t H β − 1 t μ + 1 t H +  
    [
(44) = t ϕ
0 Ct U






















 .  (
t
t γ β ) (48) 
The planner maximizes the sum of discounted lifetime utilities (3) in  t , 
nd
 
01 01 ,, , , , tt tt tt CC LLE HK
a   t ϕ  (t=0,1, ...) subject to the resource constraint (2), the accumu   lation constraint (1), and
 the cost of tuition  1 t the behavioural constraints (47) and (48). It is important to note that ϕ +  
(t=0,1,...) only appears explicitly in the condition (48). By contrast, the planner’s objective 
function and the constraints (1), (2), and (47) are independent of  1 t ϕ + . The condition (48) can 
therefore be treated as a relationship by which the “free” policy variable  1 t ϕ +  can be 
determined. This solution procedure is feasible because the coefficient of  1 t ϕ +  in (48) does not 















−  =  ++ 0 11
1
(1 ) Ct t t UE H β −  < 0 e 
,, , , , CC LLE HK  (t=0,1
1 t η +
3) is m
++




planner’s problem is equivalent to the simplified vers i
t , ...), and
ion zed in 
01 tt 01 tt tt   0 ϕ  subject 
We first study those f
 
distort education for 
all generations except the first. 
to ( e same kind of 
solution procedure has been applied by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) and others before. 
irst-order conditions of the simplified planner’s problem which are 
associated with variables which do not enter the implementability constraint (47) or which
1), (2),  47 and ( ). Th
drop out when making particular assumptions. The optimization with respect to those 
variables is not affected by (47) and should therefore remain undistorted. 
 
Proposition 5: Assume altruistic behaviour. Then it is second best not to   22
 
ition 6: Assume altruistic beha Propos viour and the utility function to be weakly separable 
between consumption and non-leisure and homothetic in consumption. Then it is 
 
Propos : Assume altruistic behaviour and 
second best not to distort the accumulation of capital for all generations except the 
first. 
ition 7 U = 01 01 (,)(,) VC C L L Λ ⋅  with homogeneous 
V. Then it is second best to tax qualified and nonqualified labour uniformly. This 
 
The pr ward. Just note that the variables t
>0) do not enter the implementability constraint. Taking partial derivativ
holds for all generations except the first. 
oof of Proposition 5 is rather straightfor   , , tt EHK  
es of the Lagrange 
rs  , tt
(t
function with respect to these variables and substituting for the Lagrange multiplie μ α  
yields the efficiency condition (8) for t>0. The proof of Proposition 6 parallels the one of 
Proposition 1 and is therefore skipped. The proof of Proposition 7 is as follows. Set 
t W ≡ t U +λ 
1
0
i it C t
i
CU
= ∑  . 
If V is homogeneous of degree  , then  U  (i=0,1). Hence the social and 
the private marginal rates of intertemporal substitution in non-leisure are equal,  
0 d ≠ (1 )



















.          ( = 4 9 )  
he equation (49) is equally obtain
with  . Taking partial derivatives of the Lagrange function with respect to ,
T ed if V is homogeneous of degree zero in the sense of (14) 
0 D ≡   01 ,, ttt KL L 
yields (27) and 
0 Lt W =− t α
0 1 Lt t FH − , 














































 by setting 
1 11 1/ tt L t F 1 τ ω + − ,  Define tax rates  it τ ≡
















F .         ( 5 0 )   δ + + −  23
The utility f d to hold for Proposition 7 are weakly separable between  unctions assume
consumption and non-leisure and homothetic in consumption. Hence Proposition 6 applies 
 the main result of Erosa and Gervais (2002) stating 
and it is second best not to distort saving. As a result, the right-hand of (50) equals one and 
labour tax rates are independent of age.  
Proposition 6 is just what one would expect in view of the literature. Proposition 7 is less 
obvious, and it even allows us to qualify
that it is generally optimal to differentiate labour taxes across the individual life cycle. The 
intuitive explanation for this result is that labour supplied in the second life period differs 
from labour supplied in the first period. While Proposition 4 confirms the result of Erosa and 
Gervais on assuming selfish individuals, Proposition 7 does not. Obviously, in the present 
framework altruism removes the need to employ age-dependent labour taxes for descendent 
generations. Age-dependent labour taxes would then be used only as a correcting device if it 
were second best to distort saving. This becomes clearer when considering utility functions 
which are additive separable between consumption and non-leisure,  01 (,) UV C C = + 01 (,) LL Λ . 
In this case (50) would equally hold but the right-hand side of (50) would only equal one in 
the optimum if V were homothetic. This is a noteworthy qualification of Erosa et al. (2002). 
Above, it is derived from the equality of the social and private marginal rates of intertemporal 
substitution in non-leisure, (49). For this equality to hold we have to assume not only 
altruism, but also a sufficiently rich set of policy instruments. In particular, the planner must 
be able to choose  it ω  independently of  t ϕ . In other words, the planner must be able to 
optimize the taxation of labour separately from the subsidization of education. 
Finally, Proposition  is interesting in that it is much stronger than the results derived in the 
Chamley-Judd literature. It holds for arbitrary utility functions, and it do
5 
es not assume 
balanced growth. That is, Proposition 5 is logically stronger than Propositions 6 and 7. And it 
is also much stronger than Proposition 2, which assumes the human capital investment 
function to be isoelastic. By contrast, Proposition 5 even holds for functions G which fail to 
be isoelastic. All this strongly reminds one of the Production Efficiency Theorem of Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971). According to this theorem the allocation of intermediate goods should 
not be distorted in second best if no lump-sum income accrues to the private sector. This is 
just what holds in the present model. Investment in human capital is modelled as an 
intermediate good in the sense that it does not affect the implementability constraint (47) for 
t>0. Furthermore, the only lump-sum income modelled is income earned by the parent 
generation living in period 0. On setting  0 1 π = , this income equals 
1 01 0 1 11 KL FK FLH −− − +  +   24
1 (1 ) K K δ − − . It does not show up in the dynasty’s budget constraint (42). It must therefore be 
income accruing to the government budget. Production Efficiency T le, 
tion 5 can be considered to be a corollary. 
The recommendation not to distort education is not easily translated into explicit tax and 
subsidy rates. The reason is that private incentives a
 The  heorem is applicab
re affected by a whole set of tax and 
and Proposi
subsidy rates, which all must be optimally set. Just inspect the altruist’s first-order condition 
(45) determining the optimal amount of human capital. After substituting for the Lagrange 
multipliers one obtains 









ϕ ω + +
+
+
.   (51) 
T on at  a is inc apital is  t only  his conditi  reveals th  the ltru t’s  entive to invest in human c no
affected by taxes on own labour income and the subsidy paid to the own cost of tuition. It is 
additionally affected by the tax on savings, by the next generation’s tax on nonqualified 
labour, and finally by the subsidy paid to the next generation’s cost of tuition. More can be 
said only after making specific assumptions. Just for the sake of illustration, assume 
U = 01 01 (,)(,) VC C L L Λ ⋅  with homogeneous V. Hence Propositions 6 and 7 apply, and it is 
optimal not to tax saving,  11 1 tK t K RF δ ++ =+ − , and to tax labour independently of age, 
L t 10 / 11 0 L t t FF 1/ tt ωω + = τ −≡  (t>0). Only if optimal wage taxes do neither differentiate across 
generations,  t τ τ = , can one in atible with efficiency for the cost of tuition to 
e rate as labour income is taxed,  (1 )
fer that it is comp
be subsidized at the sam f ϕ τ = − . This follows 
immediately from comparing (51) with (8). If the mentioned assumptions do not hold, it is 
difficult to make definite statements about the efficient structural relationship between labour 
tax rates and education subsidy rates. 
The government has to finance the exogenous cash flow of government expenditures  t A  
(t>0). If the amount of pure profit earned by the government is insufficient, distortionary taxes 
have to be employed to balance the budget. In this case, the implementability constraint (47) 
is binding, and it cannot be ruled out that it is efficient to distort the choice of education of 
generation 0. This raises the question of how to design optimal human capital policy for 
generation 0. As we are going to learn, the answer comes close to what has been shown to be 
efficient in the world of selfish individuals. More precisely, generation 0’s education should 
not be distorted if the human capital investment function is isoelastic. If however the private 
marginal cost of human capital is positive, education should be positively distorted relative to   25
the first best. To show this we maximize (3) subject to (1), (2), (47), and (48). Taking partial 
derivatives of the Lagrange function yields the following results after some tedious but 
























































































].    (55)  '
1 G
The first-order condition with respect to   i e sam 27) f
(52)–(55) and (27) for t=0 we end up with 
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00 C U ⋅ 0
HC PMC ⋅( 1 1 K K F δ + − ) − 
0
1
(1 ) λ η
α
− 
01 C U ⋅ 1
HC PMC ⋅ 1 G      (57) 














































t PMC   ] .  (58) 
he variables  and  T   0 Δ
HC
t PMC  are defined so that the parallels  th (33) d (23 ow    wi  an ) sh up. As
HC
t PMC  vanishes for isoelastic G ), we obtain 
 
Proposition 8: Assume altruistic behaviour and the human capital investment function G to be 
isoelastic. Then it is second best not to distort the first generation’s educational 
 
( t E
choice.   26
Proposition 8 is just the altruistic analogue to Proposition 2. It is a result that one could easily 
 less straightforward if the private marginal cost of human capital is positive. 
conjecture. Altruism goes beyond selfishness in internalizing efficiency effects. If it is second 
best not to distort education given that G is isoelastic and behaviour selfish, then it should all 
the more be second best not to distort education given that G is isoelastic and behaviour 
altruistic. 
Things are
Without making further assumptions, it is difficult to sign  0 Δ . However, we are able to derive 
a direct analogue to Proposition 3. More precisely,  0 Δ  can be shown to be positive if the 
growth path is balanced and if utility is homogeneous in consumption. The assumption of 
balanced growth has the effect of neutralizing the impact of initialization. 
The proof is only sketched. First note that  00 t ω ω =  follows from (43). In a second step  is   
dt G
shown to be a factor that cancels out of th aint (48), so that  t e constr ϕ  and  1 t ϕ +  are the only 
remaining variables in (48) carrying an index t. The equation can then be used to solve 
for 1 tt ϕ ϕϕ + =≡ . This is a feasible procedure, as the coefficient of ϕ  does not vanish. Just 
note that after dividing through by 



















coefficient is positive. Plugging 
G β )]. The condition of transversality,  1 <
d G β , implies that the 
ϕ  into (58) yields 
HC PMC = t
HC PMC sume  . As
HC PMC >0 






00 C U ⋅( 1 1 K K F δ + − ) > 
1
(1 ) λ η
α
− 
 >  (1 ) β η −
1 d G
−
00 C U ⋅ G  
(27) ⇔   
00 C U
01 C U ⋅ G 
 1 >  ⇔ (1 ) η − ⋅ β
d G . 
The last inequality ws from  follo  η <1 and, once more, from the condition of transversality. 
roposition 9: Assume altruistic behaviour, and U to be homogeneous in consumption. At 
 
P
balanced growth it is second best to subsidize the first generation’s educational choice 
relative to the first best if the private marginal cost of human capital, 
HC PMC , is 
positive. 
   27
It would be nice if one could similarly characterize second-best policy with regard to the first 
allows us to tell a unifying story for selfish and 
. Summary 
tion of human capital may suffer from all sorts of potential inefficiencies. Most 
strongly suggest differentiated policies. Whether education should be distorted or not appears 
generation’s choice of labour and saving. However, analogues to Propositions 1 and 4 seem 
not to hold. In particular, it seems that the first generation’s saving decision is systematically 
distorted. The reason is the factor 
00 C U  entering the right-hand side of (47). This factor 
implies a lack of symmetry when taking partial derivatives of B with respect to  0 i C  (i=0,1). 
As a result it is second best to distort saving.  
The parallelism between Propositions 9 and 3 
altruistic individuals. Altruism well reduces the need to subsidize education relative to laissez-
faire. Altruism also implies that the second-best tax policy for descendent generations is more 
like the first-best policy. The accumulation of human capital should remain undistorted, and – 
if utility functions are well selected – labour taxes need not be differentiated across the 
individual life cycle. The short-run policy recommendations for altruism, however, parallel 
the long-run recommendations for selfishness. Labour has to be taxed, and – given that the 
elasticity of the human capital investment function is strictly increasing – education should be 
subsidized relative to the first best. Whether saving should be taxed is not a matter of 
selfishness or altruism. With regard to descendent generations it primarily depends on 





of them have simply been assumed away in the present study. Such a procedure is, no doubt, 
debatable. Critical is the ignoring of possible causes of capital market or policy failure. Even 
more critical is the ignoring of individual heterogeneity and informational asymmetry. Still, 
the procedure is defended with the objective of studying efficient taxation in Ramsey’s 
tradition. More precisely, this paper aims at bridging the gap that separates the two strands of 
Ramsey tax analyses which exist for the finite and the infinite planning horizon. Our 
knowledge of efficient human capital policy in Ramsey’s tradition is largely shaped by 
incompatible results derived for the different horizons. The results derived for the infinite 
horizon suggest that education should not be distorted in the long run, just as saving should 
not be distorted in the long run. Hence it seems as if efficient policy does not differentiate 
between human and nonhuman capital. By way of contrast, the results in finite horizon   28
to depend primarily on how education affects the individual’s earning potential. More 
precisely, only if the earnings function is weakly separable in qualified labour supply and 
education and if the elasticity with respect to the latter is constant, should the choice of 
education be not distorted by second-best policy (Jacobs and Bovenberg, 2008). By way of 
contrast, the question of whether saving should be distorted or not primarily has to be 
answered with regard to the taxpayer’s preferences. More precisely, saving should not be 
taxed if the taxpayer’s utility is weakly separable between consumption and labour/non-
leisure and homothetic in consumption (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972). 
The model filling the gap between finite and infinite Ramsey tax analyses is one with 
overlapping generations. The present paper studies second-best policy for education, saving, 
The other is individual selfishness. 
and labour in such an overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth. There have 
been earlier attempts to do the same. In view of the present study, two attempts deserve to be 
cited more than others. These are by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) on one side and by 
Wigger (2002, Sec. 3.4) and Docquier et al. (2007) on the other side. The most conspicuous 
differences to the present study are the following ones. The focus of the present study is on 
human capital accumulation, while the focus of Atkeson et al. is on nonhuman capital. Their 
paper contains extensions to both endogenous education and overlapping generations, but it 
fails to integrate the two. The work of Wigger and Docquier et al. does integrate them. 
However, it does not allow for endogenous labour supply and second-best taxation. The 
authors assume the availability of non-distortionary tax instruments, which the present study 
does not. In a sense, the present paper starts where Atkeson et al. and where Wigger and 
Docquier et al. stop. It goes beyond Atkeson et al. by integrating endogenous education and 
overlapping generations, and it goes beyond Wigger and Docquier et al. by endogenizing 
labour supply and by doing second-best tax analysis. 
The present paper studies two possible reasons for allocational inefficiency. One is the non-
availability of non-distortionary tax instruments. 
Taxpayers are assumed to externalize the positive effect that their human capital investments 
have on the productivity of descendent generations. As stressed by Wigger and by Docquier et 
al., selfishness is the source of an intergenerational externality. It gives reason to subsidize 
education relative to laissez-faire. Such subsidization, however, requires government 
revenues. In the framework studied by Wigger and by Docquier et al. it is efficient to 
subsidize education up to the first-best level where marginal social costs equal marginal social 
returns. The result assumes the availability of non-distortionary tax instruments. The key 
assumption of the present study, however, is that no tax instruments are available that would   29
allow the government to raise the revenue needed to subsidize education without creating 
distortions. As it turns out, it is still second best not to distort education if only the human 
capital investment function is isoelastic. This result can be considered to be the dynamic 
version of the education efficiency proposition known from static Ramsey analysis. 
It is, however, argued that an isoelastic investment function has the unappealing implication 
that all human capital accumulated by past generations melts down to zero if only one 
 effect that education has on descendent 
nctions, the result on 
generation stops investing. If, by way of contrast, human capital depreciates just by some 
fraction and if the investment function’s elasticity is strictly increasing, then investment 
incentives should overshoot the first best at balanced growth. In other words, it is efficient in 
the long run to combine positive tax wedges in the labour market with an effective subsidy 
wedge for education. The need to subsidize is shown to increase in (i) the private marginal 
cost of human capital, (ii) the cost resulting from the non-availability of lump-sum taxes, and 
(iii) the growth gap. Furthermore, it turns out to be efficient to tax labour such that qualified 
labour is less distorted than nonqualified labour. 
If taxpayers are altruists with respect to descendent generations, one clear reason for 
government intervention does not apply. The
generations’ productivity is internalized by altruists. The only remaining inefficiency 
modelled in this paper is caused by the need to employ distortionary taxes for financing 
government expenditures. As it turns out, all generations except the first one should still be 
given non-distorted incentives for accumulating human and nonhuman capital. Furthermore, 
labour should be taxed uniformly across the individual life cycle when utility is homogeneous 
in consumption and multiplicative in the sub-utilities of consumption and non-leisure. This 
result allows us to qualify the main result of Erosa and Gervais (2002), who stress the need to 
employ age-dependent labour taxes in second best. In the present framework, however, 
altruism has the effect of implying equality of the social and private marginal rates of 
intertemporal substitution in non-leisure. The optimality of uniform labour taxation is an 
immediate though intriguing corollary to this equality. In view of the Chamley-Judd literature, 
results suggesting non-distortionary taxation may not be too surprising. 
Striking, however, is the strength of the result concerning human capital accumulation. While 
the other results on non-distortionary taxation require specific utility fu
human capital accumulation holds without any comparable qualification. One only has to 
assume that no lump-sum income accrues to the private sector. It is argued that this result on   30
efficient education policy is best interpreted as a corollary to the Production Efficiency 
Theorem of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 
The results on non-distortionary taxation do not require removing all distortions. On the 
iduals is as follows. Altruism well 
eferences 
 V. V. Chari, and P. J. Kehoe, 1999, Taxing capital income: A bad idea. Federal 
contrary, the labour supply of descendent generations will be distorted if the government has 
to finance exogenous government expenditures by relying on distortionary instruments. Nor 
do the results on non-distortionary taxation extend to the dynasty’s first generation, indexed 
by zero in the present paper. A more precise characterization of optimal policy for generation 
0 is difficult, as the specific features not only depend on the shape of the human capital 
investment function but also on initial values of key variables. As in the case with selfish 
individuals, it is efficient not to distort education if the investment function is isoelastic in 
education. If, however, the elasticity is strictly increasing and if the impact of initialization is 
suppressed by assuming balanced growth, it is second best to subsidize education relative to 
the first best. The reason is the same as the one given before in the scenario with selfish 
individuals. A strictly increasing elasticity of the investment function has the effect that it is 
second best to subsidize education in static analysis, and this effect extends to the dynamic 
framework. At balanced growth the need to subsidize increases in the derivative of the 
investment function’s elasticity, and it is the stronger, the more binding the non-availability of 
lump-sum taxes is and the more deficient growth is. 
The unifying bottom line for selfish and altruistic indiv
reduces the need to subsidize education relative to laissez faire, and altruism also implies that 
descendent generations should be given non-distorted incentives for accumulating human 
capital. The short-run policy recommendations for altruism, however, agree with the long-run 
recommendations for selfishness. Labour has to be taxed, and – given that the elasticity of the 
human capital investment function is strictly increasing – education should be subsidized 
relative to the first best. Whether saving should be taxed is not a matter of selfishness or 
altruism. It primarily depends on assumptions made with regard to the marginal rate of 
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